THE  TREATMENT  OF  IDEALS 


IN 

SANTAYANA’S  LIFE  OF  REASON 

BY 

EDITH  SKEMP 


THESIS 


FOE  THE 

DEGREE  OF  BACHELOR  OF  ARTS 

IN 

PHILOSOPHY 


COLLEGE  OF  LIBERAL  ARTS  AND  SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


1922 


I ‘ 

Sk2 


THE  TREATMENT  OF  IDEALS  IN  SANTAYANA'S 
LIFE  OF  REASON 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  LIFE  OF  REASON. 

'"The  life  of  reason,  as  I conceive  it,  is  simply  the 
dreaming  mind  becoming  coherent,  devising  symbols  and 
methods,  such  as  languages,  by  which  it  may  fitly  survey 
its  own  career,  and  the  forces  of  nature  on  which  that 
career  depends  . Reason  thereby  raises  our  vegetative 
career  into  a poetic  revelation  and  transcript  of  the 
truth 

In  these  two  sentences  George  Santayana  has  not  only 
sketched  his  conception  of  the  life  of  reason  and  sug- 
gested the  ideals  which  are  the  subject  of  this  thesis, 
but  has  pointed  out  two  of  the  three  elements  which  mark 
his  philosophy,  namely,  poetry  and  natiiralism . It  must 
be  remembered  that  Santayana  is  a poet  of  no  mean  rank 
among  the  moderns.  It  is  altogether  natural,  therefore, 
that  he  should  admit  poetic  conceits  into  his  more  serious 
writings  and  should  see  poetic  tendencies  in  the  somewhat 


1.  Santayana,  George,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  Vol . 18,  No.  26, 
Dec.  22,  1921,  p.  705. 


5C0.308 


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1. 


lyrical  life  of  reason. 


Poetry^  hov/ever,  has  not  carried.  Santayana  into 
philosophical  extravagances,  because  it  has  been  held 
in  check  by  an  even  stronger  in:pulse  toward  naturalism. 

At  one  time  Santayana  followed  the  philosophy  of  H-jii:e  . 
Becoming  dissatisfied,  however,  with  the  futility  of 
this  reason,  he  finally  evolved  a more  satisfying  scheme 
of  thought  along  naturalistic  lines  . Here,  although 
adriiitting  that  his  conclusions  are  but  imaginings,  he 
nevertheless  submits  them  for  inspection,  confident 
that  the  facts  v;ill  justify  the  fiction.  He  doss  not 
hesitate,  therefore,  to  postulate  the  life  of  reason 

as  arising  from  a backcurrent,  or  eddy,  in  the  continuous 
and  chaotic  flux  of  impulse  and  sensation.  The  first 
real  step  upward  in  this  life  of  reason  comes  with  the 
attachment  of  pleasure  and  pain  to  objects  and  the 
recognition  of  values,  or  ideal  interests. 

But  poetry  and  naturalism  are  not  the  only  character- 
istics of  Santaya,na's  philosophy.  The  third  element  is 
loyalty  to  the  Greeks . In  his  scheme  of  thought  he 
embodies  the  teachings  of  Parmenides  and  Heraclitus,  of 

Aristotle,  Socrates,  and  Plato.  So  completely  has  he 
imbibed  their  philosophy  that  he  might  be  called  The 
Living  Greek  . 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/treatmentofidealOOskem 


-3- 


Santayana  does  not,  however,  content  himself  with  a 
mere  hodge-podge  of  primitive  conceptions  . Not  only  has 
he  sorted  and  combined  the  teachings  of  his  masters;  he 
has  given  their  v/ords  a new  dress  . It  may  be  that  the 
truth  is  unchanging.  V/hether  it  be  so  or  not,  men  change 
and  knowledge  increases  . To  be  valued,  old  truths  must 
be  linked  up  v;ith  the  new  discoveries  and  restated  in 
language  comprehensible  to  the  modern  ear.  It  is  this 
task  of  modernizing  and  enlarging  classic  truths  v;hich 
Santayana  purposes  . So  it  is  that  The  Life  of  Reason, 
while  largely  new  in  thought,  is  yet  an  outgrowth  and 
an  interpretation  of  the  intellectual  labors  of  Hera- 
clitus, Plato,  and  their  compeers  . 

Fidelity  to  the  Greeks  appears  in  Santayana's 
earliest  conception  of  the  birth  of  reason.  Starting 
with  the  flux  of  Heraclitus,  in  this  case  a subjective 
chaos  of  unordered  impulse  and  imagination,  Santayana 
traces  the  course  of  human  intelligence . In  its  de- 
velopment he  employs  the  constant  laws  of  union  and 
separation  postulated  by  Democritus,  by  which  recurring 
and  differing  sensations  build  up  an  impression  of  ex- 
ternal realities.  He  also  makes  use  of  the  unchanging 
unity  of  Parmenides,  illustrated  by  the  ideal  . Through- 


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out  he  me,intains  the  objective  and  naturalistic  point  of 
view  characteristic  of  these  early  philosophers. 

Santayana  is  f^urther  a Greek  in  his  theory  of 
knowledge,  which  is  distinctly  skeptical  . He  denies 
any  portraiture  of  outer  events  . Knowledge  is  merely 
representative.  It  consists  solely  in  those  inter- 
pretations of  the  object  which  are  given  by  nervous 
reactions.  There  can  be  no  direct  contact  of  mind 
and  external  object  . 

Not  with  Greek  naturalism,  however,  nor  v/ith  a 
skeptical  concept  of  knowledge,  does  Santayana  pause. 

It  is  in  his  treatment  of  the  later  Greeks  that  he 
sweeps  on  to  his  most  interesting  conclusions  . For 
not  only  does  he  approach  that  realm  of  the  ideal  or 
universal  which  so  absorbed  both  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
but  he  makes  their  problem  his  . He  devotes  his  at- 
tention to  a reinterpretation  which  shall  reveal  the 
inv/ard  harmony  of  the  apparently  differing  view's. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Plato  created  ideal 
absolutes  . All  true  existences  he  believed  to  be 
ideal  . The  world  of  sense  was  for  him  merely  a land 
of  shadowy  images,  reflections  or  imperfect  copies  of 
eternal  verities.  And  this  conception  Santayana 


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accepts  in  part  . He,  too,  creates  perriianent  realities 
out  of  ideals.  Nevertheless,  he  makes  a certain  reser- 
vation. Those  ideals  do  not — can  not — exist  independent 
of  the  human  mind.  Further,  they  must  necessarily  be 
linked  to  that  world  of  sense  which  Plato  considers  so 
imperfect  a counterpart  of  the  universals . 

It  is  in  this  correlation  of  the  ideal  and  the  physical 
that  Santayana  agrees  with  Aristotle  . For  the  latter  phil- 
osopher "everything  ideal  has  a natural  basis  and  every- 
thing  natural  an  ideal  development."  But  this  fact 
Santayana  finds  tp  be  no  obstacle.  When  reality  has  an 
ideal  dimension  the  "world  of  ideas"  may  still  exist. 

Perhaps  Santayana  draws  his  own  naturalism  from  this 
naturalistic  position  of  Aristotle.  At  any  rate,  in 
his  theory  of  the  ideal,  which  is  stated  in  the  following 

chapters,  he  shows  an  ideal  Platonic  in  its  reality  as 
well  as  Aristotelian  in  its  naturalism.  And  over  all 
of  this  he  casts  his  characteristic  glow  of  poesy. 


1 . Ibid . p . 31 . 


— o- 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  ENTRANCE  OF  IDEALS. 

One  of  the  early  steps  in  the  birth  of  reason  is  the 
attachment  of  pleasure  or  pain  to  objects.  From  that 
attachment  there  arises  in  the  mind  a perception  of  in- 
terests. Certain  objects  appear  more  desirable  because 
they  contain  more  good.  The  whole  life  of  reason,  Santa- 
yana declares,  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  the  unity  given 
to  existence  by  a mind  in  love  with  the  good.  "When 
definite  interests  are  recognized  and  the  values  of  things 
are  estimated  by  that  standard,  action  at  the  same  time 

veering  in  harmony  with  that  estimation,  then  reason  has 

1 

been  born  and  a moral  world  has  risen."  Life  depends 
\:pon  the  fixation  of  interests  and  begins  to  have  value 
and  continuity  when  something  definite  to  live  for,  namely, 
ideals,  appears. 

Just  what  is  an  ideal?  Ordinarily  it  might  be  de- 
fined as  conscioiosness  of  a value.  Yet  such  a definition 
is  all  too  brief  to  account  for  the  conception  of  the  ideal 
which  appears  in  The  Life  of  Reason. 

In  the  first  place,  an  ideal  is  a fundamental  of  the 
life  of  reason.  Just  as  the  mind  is  natively  inclined 


1,  Santayana,  George,  The  Life  of  Reason,  Vol . I.,  Intro- 
duction and  Reason  in  Common  Sense,  p . 47 . Scribner's, 
New  York,  1S05 . 


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rvi 


-7- 


toward  form  and  identification  in  the  external  world,  so 
it  has  an  inherent  tendency  toward  expression  in  idealiza- 
tion. In  fact,  Santayana  declares  that  consciousness 
really  cares  only  for  its  ideals  The  ideal  is  that 
standard  which  thought  proposes  to  itself,  and  while 
thought  itself  cannot  have  in  its  process  a lianinous  de- 
dtictive  clearness,  yet  it  does  endow  its  product  with 
that  q'oality.  Every  ideal  initially  envisages  a genuine 
and  innocent  good.  It  is  a goal  set  by  intelligence. 

And  the  life  of  reason,  according  to  Santayana,  "will 
be  a name  for  that  part  of  experience  which  perceives 
and  pursues  ideals — all  conduct  so  controlled  and  all 

2 

sense  so  interpreted  as  to  perfect  natural  happiness." 

No  ideal  can  be  adventitious  and  unmeaning.  There 
is  no  more  colossal  error,  to  Santayana,  than  the  belief 
that  ideals  have  no  soil  in  mortal  life  and  no  possible 
f\ilfilment  there.  An  ideal  is  the  sum  of  given  demands, 
a resultant  or  synthesis  of  impulses  already  afoot.  As 
an  expression  of  human  nature  in  operation  it  must  in  the 
end  involve  the  primary  human  faculties.  Since  human 
nature  varies,  its  ideal  can  not,  of  course,  have  a greater 
constancy  than  the  demands  which  it  expresses  . "Ideals 
are  free,"  says  Santayana,  "but  they  are  neither  more 
numerous  nor  more  variable  than  the  living  natures  that 


1 . Ibid  .,  p . 49 • 

2 . Ibid.,  p . 3 . 

3 . Ibid.,  p . 267 . 


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generate  them."^  Nevertheless,  that  which  is  essentially 
a human  outgrowth  cannot  be  adventitious  and  unmeaning, 
regardless  of  its  variability  or  of  its  possible  fulfil- 
ment . 

Indeed,  to  deny  the  meaning  of  the  ideal  is  to  deny 
the  value  of  science.  All  science  is  fundamentally  ideal 
since  it  is  primarily  concerned  with  validity  and  truth, 
which  are  ideal  relations.  The  ideal  is  the  foundation 
of  all  art,  of  religion,  and  of  society.  The  very  con- 
ception of  the  external  world  by  which  man  lives,  his 
belief  that  nature  is  a unity,  is  ideal.  And  it  is  only 
in  the  realm  of  ideals  that  omniscience  can  ever  be  found. 

Furthermore,  why  should  ideals  be  advent itio^os? 

They  are  not  miraculous  forces,  superimposed.  Thought 
is  a form  of  life  as  natural  as  nutrition  or  generation. 
Equally  natural  is  the  product  of  rationality,  the  ideal. 
Every  ideal  has  a natural  basis;  everything  nat'oral  an 
ideal  development.  Though  one  grants  that  sense  be  the 
sole  reality,  must  it  not  even  then,  asks  Santayana,  be 
sentient  sometimes  of  the  ideal?  The  relation  between 
the  two  resembles  that  of  the  site  of  a city  and  the  city 
which  has  been  reared  upon  it.  Both  exist;  both  are 
significant.  So  living  thought,  even  though  dealing  with 


1 . Ibid .,  p . 8 
2 . Ibid . , p . 79 . 


_Q_ 


a sensuous  content,  may  pass  out  of  itself  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  ideal,  of  the  eventual. 

That  the  ideal  has  a natural  basis  is  indicated  by 
internal  evidence.  "Every  phase  of  the  ideal  world," 
Santayana  declares,  "emanates  from  the  natural  and  loudly 
proclaims  its  origin  by  the  interest  it  takes  in  natural 
existences,  of  which  it  gives  a rational  interpretation."^ 

For,  he  asks,  "what  are  ideals  about,  what  do  they  idealize, 

2 

except  natural  existences  and  natural  passions?"  The 

fact  is  that  Nature  blossoms  v/ith  ideals  which,  according 

to  Santayana,  are  forerunners  of  her  success.  "Nature 

carries  ius  ideal  with  it  and... the  progressive  organiza- 

3 

tion  of  irrational  impulses  makes  a rational  life." 

But,  comes  the  question,  how  about  the  reality  of 
ideals?  Are  they  not  mere  figments  of  reason?  Santayana's 
answer  is  decisive.  "In  an  original  thinker,"  he  states, 

"to  call  a thing  supernatural,  or  spiritual,  or  intelligible, 
is  to  declare  that  it  is  no  thing  at  all .. .but  a value... 
a merely  ideal  principle."^  But  does  an  ideal  have  to  be 
physical  to  be  real?  The  demands  which  gave  rise  to  it 
are  real,  just  as  the  stimulus  which  gives  rise  to  a sensa- 
tion. "The  ideal  has  the  same  relation  to  given  demands 


1 . 

Ibid., 

P • 

335. 

3 . 

Ibid ., 

P • 

383 . 

3 . 

Ibid., 

P • 

391  . 

4 . 

Ibid., 

P • 

194. 

0- 


tiiat  the  reality  has  to  given  perceptions.”^ 

Indeed,  Santayana  declares,  the  ideal  may  be  more 
real  than  an  external  object.  Philosophers,  he  says, 
have  transferred  to  the  living  act  what  is  true  only  of 
its  ideal  and  have  given  it  static  terms  and  eternal 
relations.  As  a m.atter  of  fact,  the  external  object, 
so  far  as  accurate  reproduction  of  it  in  the  mind  is 
concerned,  is  nothing  but  flux.  "What  helps  in  the 
first  place  to  disclose  a permanent  object  is  a perm.an- 
ent  sensation.  Existence  reveals  reality  when  the  flux 
discloses  som.ething  permianent  that  dominates  it.”  And 
such  is  the  working  of  the  human  mind  that  what  is  thus 
dominated,  though  it  be  the  primary  existence  itself,  is 
thereby  degraded  to  appearance.  ’’Ideal  objects  may  ac- 
cordingly be  in  a way  more  real  and  enduring  than  things 
3 

external.”  For  after  all,  what  is  a reality  but  a term 
of  speech,  based  on  a psychological  complex  of  memories, 
associations,  and  expectations,  but  constituted  in  its 

3 

ideal  independence  by  the  assertive  energy  of  thought? 
Santayana  points  out  that  the  object  which  we  consider 
a reality  is  an  ideal  representative  of  a group  of  sen- 
sations, and  not  any  one  sensation  alone.  External 


1 . Ibid.,  t) . 357  . 
3 . Ibid.,  p . 131 . 
3 . Ibid  .,  p . 82  . 


>?<v.»'-.*.-  • •• 


'li  V. 


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X •■  XV<X*T 


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: . . - V . -.sp^ 
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Uipn^ixt  re  .irr 


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j'  C * X'"*'!  lii^-7-7  A' 


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iy:Vj.\jj*:  : re  --r,  :r:: 


it 


- V •«  ^ ■i.'*-»i^  #-.*  ^ 


. r :^0  X C*  ■:.  1 - i-‘  >'  T' 


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•:  i'l  wi.0  5i  ' 


:;ii.;nv':.:  & ; t :.'s;.j4  rxs-.^ 


V :xr /i:?  v^v  50^1^  : 


X.-i.-n  j . X* 


Ol'f.lOti  1\7X’ X‘- _X  il  •nC  -IKi-/- 

• ^ • -I  ’aJ  ! 


0^  ^ ? 


'f* 


: , C-'"  X V i.  J - I .A  J u-Ti-  ^ <fcilOx^il . - OC£0Jj|^ 

V > .'  ^ aa-3ia  ' ',:  ' *■•' cp  . t-io ci*'. h.i  i iBi . • -r  ■ 


I ' '*' 


1 *«  « ‘*  V * ^ vi  i 

: ? aaa  vqii: 

. c .1  > ; 'X  .1 0 i * e sS^  ^ ■'!  •' ' 


■•J 


- f 

T * 


•1 


I «•'«'  • 

. :c-:  . q 


j., 


F~ 


-11- 


objeota  are  merely  conceived  realities  on  an  ideal  plane. 

The  single  nature  or  set  of  conditions  for  experience  which 
the  intellect  constructs  is  the  object  of  our  thoughts  and 
perceptions  ideally  completed.^  And  since  the  ideal  re- 
mains while  the  flux  of  sensation  passes  on,  ideal  objects 
have  a permanence  which  designates  them  as  real . 

The  fact  is  that  an  ideal  world  is  recognized  by  reason 
from  the  beginning.  The  first  reactions  which  result  in 
the  development  of  rationality  are  reactions  to  spiritual 
realities.  Without  the  harmony  of  reason,  of  course, 
the  ideal  loses  its  finality.  But  so  does  knowledge  of 
the  external  world.  Given  this  harmony,  "henceforth 

things  actual  and  things  desired  are  confronted  by  an  ideal 

2 

which  has  both  pertinence  and  authority”  due  to  its  liv- 
ing stability.  "Knowledge  reaches  reality  when  it  touches 
its  ideal  goal.  Reality  is  known  when,  as  in  mathemiat ics , 

3 

a stable  and  unequivocal  object  is  developed  by  thinking." 

The  function  of  the  ideal  is  practical;  it  is  a guide 
to  the  interpretation  and  utilization  of  experience.  It 
serves  as  a link  between  fact  and  fact.  As  the  object 
of  a profound  and  voluminous  desire  for  the  good,  it 
should  light  man  forward  like  a torch,  revealing  new  and 


1 . Ibid.,  p . 106 . 
2 . Ibid  . , p . 268 . 

p . 60  . 


U -.  ■ - -jT-'SSi,.  - • ' *a  • 'Trtffi  ■■■.'v  . ■'  BB  „ • •^■‘S.  '•  ...V  . 'AijjvjwWr.;' 


:;i6 


'%■**.  • . . *»  . ' ; ■ - . ■ -..'■  . -^  *.  -• 


W>3  '‘-i>z^i«i}^!^3■i^>Mi^  »wi' -s  A"S»Vfstc«MO 


; ii  md'i  '^e'j  4pIt> 

SHS^'jt'Sk- ' ■■'■  . -.■  - fcjl  j.^  _.  ji’4'  A J1V'  ■■.  ♦ .V ft 'rfrfj»?'iHft**r  1 


feV-v  .;’c/nvw^^\l?S8^  ! rjtiTfifijrt®  ndJ.  li>: 


i<^l 


K.  91^-  ■ ‘5l  • *'  . »t»ixc  ?i'  *Z-^-fi3!  nc  2'4^ 

• icoftfo  . j'ost  * >i^i)  X045I  ^ 


2*^4 -■  . -tf's,  ' -^  ■ ‘ j. 

~y  LiU":  -^fia  ^ a»^  ga::5i  ^ 

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**’-'»■’  . i t • -■• 

:’.i'#J 


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ms^' 


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O' 


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■ii. 


.1 


better  fields  beyond. 

Ideals  are  essentially  representative.  As  goals 
they  serve  to  signify  all  that  appears  most  desirable, 
all  that  man  strives  to  attain.  But  ideals  are  also 
regulative,  since  they  act  as  guides  to  conduct.  They 
help  man  to  lead  himself  out  of  his  dream  "by  the  promise 
and  eloquence  of  that  dream  itself."^  Further,  ideals 
give  permanence,  stabilit^^  to  concepts  which  are  neces- 
sary to  man's  development.  They  envisage  the  absent 

and  make  it  appear  attainable.  The  ideal,  says  Santa- 

2 

yana,  "really  fosters  all  possible  pleasures." 

Yet  the  ideal  does  not  in  the  least  conflict  with 
nature.  It  is  in  reality  in  harmony  with  natural  forces, 
and  far  from  demanding  any  profound  revolution,  merely 
expresses  her  actual  tendency  and  forecasts  what  her  per- 
fect functioning  would  be 

Previously  it  has  been  stated  that  an  ideal  is  the 
object  of  a profo^und  and  volmiinous  human  desire — the 
outgrowth  of  huiman  needs  . It  is  a guide  which  reason 
creates  to  point  the  path  toward  constantly  increasing 
good.  Yet  ideals  are  discarded  as  human  nature  varies. 


1 . Ibid . , p . 54 . 

3 . Ibid  . , p . 363  . 
3 . Ibid.,  p . 367  . 


-13- 


Does  this  mean  that  ideals  have  no  practical  value? 

Ho  ideal  bears  a tag  to  show  its  worth.  Yet  the  test 
of  the  extrinsic  value  of  an  ideal  depends  upon  its 
f-anc  tioning  . The  ideal  which  satisfies  the  demands 
that  condition  it,  which  links  up  experience  and  raises 
it  to  a higher  level,  which  guides  conduct  in  the  direc- 
tion of  human  betterment, — that  ideal  has  extrinsic 
worth.  As  Santayana  states,  "To  deserve  adhesion  it 
needs  only  to  be  adequate  as  an  ideal,  that  is,  to  ex- 
press completely  what  the  soul  at  present  demands,  and 
to  do  justice  to  all  extant  interests."^ 

It  may  be  urged  that  ideals  cannot  always  be  reached 
by  human  hands;  that  the  ideal  is  not  practical.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  according  to  Santayana,  "the  greatness 
of  the  ideal  has  been  put  in  its  vagueness  and  in  an 
elasticity  which  makes  it  wholly  indeterminate."^  Were 
ideals  to  be  hard  and  fast,  what  a detriment  to  progress'. 
It  is  the  remoteness  of  the  horizon  v;hich  lures  men  on, 
unaware  of  the  distance  over  which  they  have  travelled. 

After  all,  it  is  the  ideal  aspect  that  endows  exist- 
ence with  character  and  value.  Life  is  existence  with 
values  . Consciousness  is  the  least  ideal  of  things  v/hen 


1 . Ibid  . , p . S55  . 
3 . Ibid.,  p . 381  . 


k > A 


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-14- 


reason  is  taken  out  of  it,  and  it  is  reason  which  creates 
that  eternal  realm  which  is  tenanted  by  ideals.  Had  ideals 
no  other  function,  were  they  wholly  unattainable,  yet  they 
would  have  the  practical  value  of  changing  a mere  existence 
to  life.  They  set  at  once  the  stimulus  and  the  goal  to  the 
life  of  reason. 

For  even  though  ideals  had  no  extrinsic  worth,  though 
they  failed  in  their  function,  yet  proof  remains  of  their 
intrinsic  value.  The  fact  that  reason  cannot  cease  to 
create  and  to  cherish  them  shows  a value  which -demands  no 
other  criterion.  The  ideal  is  desirable  simply  because 
it  is  ideal,  because  it  represents  the  highest  toward  which 
man  may  stretch.  Even  though  it  be  unattainable,  it  is 
still  "what  lent  music  to  throbs  and  significance  to  being. 

But  grant  that  ideals  have  reality;  that  they  are  essential 
to  human  happiness.  Is  pragmatic  value  sufficient  warrant 
for  a claim  to  validity?  Further,  are  all  ideals  equally 
legitimate?  What  is  the  sign  of  their  trustworthiness? 

Efficacy  is  Santayana's  touchstone  in  the  test  of 
legitimacy  of  ideals.  That  ideal  which  fulfills  the  function 
of  satisfying  its  original  demand  is  genuine.  Those  ideals 
alone  which  lack  a firm  basis  of  fact  and  which  are,  therefore, 
unable  to  perform  their  duty  of  satisfaction,  are  spurious. 


1.  Ibid.,  p.  79. 


-14a- 


But  not  all  ideals  establish  their  legitimacy  in 
the  same  way.  The  test  for  validity  varies  with  the 
field  of  human  existence.  Are  scientific  ideals  to 
be  judged  by  the  same  criterion  as  those  of  art,  or 
religion?  No.  Just  as  Santayana  places  science  and 
religion  on  distinct  planes,  never  meeting  and  never 
conflicting,  so  he  deals  with  the  ideals  on  those  planes 
by  different  methods. 

The  clue  to  this  distinction  lies  in  the  basic 
purpose  of  the  various  fields.  What  does  science 
attempt?  And  religion?  Santayana  believes  that  the 
two  can  never  conflict  because  they  lie  in  separate 
spheres.  Science  is  essentially  concerned  with  ex- 
planation. It  seeks  the  how  and  the  when  and  the  why 
of  experience.  It  engages  primarily  in  a dispassionate 
search  for  information.  The  ideal  of  science,  then,  to 
prove  its  truth  must  be  efficacious  in  assembling  about 
it  a self-supporting  framework  of  fact.  Then,  and  only 
then,  may  it  be  judged  genuine. 

But  the  legitimacy  of  religious  ideals  is  another 
question.  Here  is  needed  no  buttressing  by  experience. 
Religion  is  fundamentally  concerned  with  aspiration. 

Even  the  religion  arising  from  fear  aspires  to  protection 
of  the  gods.  And  as  religion  becomes  more  rational,  it 


. ^ . ' 


k-Voi/ii' 


10  ^ 70 


a • ■'-  i 


7i&  ^ i i.  -;j  V ■^;^  i ■ • - k -~v  1 0 1 ^ 8® ''-fid r 
:.t=\  f 0;*x7:T<;tCa  . ' ^ . _ 

v;'  40  : 

-■  ,i  w—  Out'w  • ■ '-  . • 4 

' * J ' 

•V’ 

• : , ■ ;'  J.  . .-•  i jie  i it ' 0 , 5 - :'  -■  -■ -u  i - 1; 

. '■  xJt*^ 

ui>£-o  ■■:?  ni  * i'ioc4  v*?  r - *at 

:;Vi:ek.0ie  --  ^ 


:a^\  :i: 


1-4 


i;-* ;»»  .-7  1 


'-■-  VSJ-  - : 

'-^  ■ ■'  .■ 

-cl 


•.  I ' 


: V ,.  -. 


• j^c  rl4  tv  :.-  v^:?Ov. '■ '0  ,i-.^i;  .1)0 


sTc  yir;oo  t‘'.o::  aio  c 


«k-,  'TiC*  ..  .J>' 


l<i 


{ :;?a 


■•<'*.  • 


sii:^. 


'iCf 


vi>^  ,4»i 


. ’ mux  "i 

j.  ^ X ^ 

: : ‘^0  i 


?c 


. f ' • V - 

'■  ;■  ;jl-.  ' 


V<7-(  »J  ■ 


■ ‘r 


':iy^  W r 


k V 


“ V,  •, 


^5’- 


ic-i 


1 

'i.'i—'y:  B-i  : 

‘-  Ol  t.  ‘ . 

1..  ■,  r .0-1  !■  J . 

J ^ 

i;  ■ 

. »:  i j eri/p! 

►;;rin  fj®... 

. V - 

6X  ..^  J - .«>? 

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’S'l  . . 

ot..  r^  .r 

. >Xgi!X'  •'  £••’  • 

-•-■ 

■ r* 


■‘'^v 

is. 


1 


-14b- 


links  to  itself  a spiritual  desire  for  morality,  for 
virtue.  The  criterion,  therefore,  for  ideals  in  this 
field  of  the  life  of  reason  m\ist  be  aspiration.  Do  reli 
gious  ideals  make  men  desire  more  passionately  the  purple 
heights  of  spirituality?  And  do  they  reward  aspiration? 
If  so,  they  are  thereby  proved  legitimate.  Their  valid- 
ity must  be  beyond  challenge. 

So  much,  then,  for  the  general  characteristics  of 
ideals  in  rational  life.  In  the  following  chapter 
Santayana's  theory  of  the  ideal  will  be  discussed  more 
concretely  and  its  application  shown  in  one  phase  of 
the  life  of  reason. 


Jx  .«^i  1hik»T.V»  rf.f  I'^-b'.. -&itf  r > AliTfi  TZ  ^ ^PAL* 


■ > 


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' v."*  -XS  • ■ 

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^f! ^ SiwW  feff'is&t  y-Cy.  B'X 

JSa^^' 


u 


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^'"  ^.-  ' ^ <‘  4'’!|BiS  ■ ~1%-^'"  y^K0*£*f'' 

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'jjA  .;-  ,.’:i. . 


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’ - »-v 


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• ’-f . 


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► o-i . A.wt.  ^‘>*»  *■ 

*..4'» 


-15- 


CrlAPTER  III. 
IDEALS  IN  RELIGION. 


The  life  of  reason  takes  varied  forms.  As  the 
fusion  of  impulse  and  reflection,  it  may  be  found 
expressed  in  religion  or  science  or  the  imitative 
arts.  Of  these,  however,  the  first  appears  more 
intimately  connected  xvith  rational  life.  Santayana 
expresses  this  connection  in  the  following  words: 
'•Religion,  in  its  intent,  is  a more  conscious  and 
direct  pursuit  of  the  Life  of  Reason  than  is  society, 

i;; 

science  os  art.  For  these  approach  and  fill  out  the 
ideal  life  tentatively  and  piecemeal,  hardly  regarding 
the  goal  or  caring  for  the  ultimate  justification  of 
their  instinctive  aims."^  Further,  "religion  is  a 
form  of  rational  living  more  empirical,  looser,  more 

p 

primitive  than  art."*^  Hence,  although  language,  sci- 
ence, art  or  society — all  of  which  are  compacted  of 
ideas, — might  serve  as  a concrete  example  of  Santayana's 
use  of  the  ideal,  religion  is  the  more  satisfactory  as 

1.  Santayana,  George,  The  Life  of  Reason,  Vol  . III., 
Reason  in  Religion,  p.  8.  Scribner's,  New  York,  1905. 


2 . Idem  . p . 35  . 


1r% 

o- 


an  exemplification  of  the  part  which  the  ideal  pla^^a  in 
rational  life. 

If  reason  is  the  process  which  enables  men  to  realize 
their  ideals,  it  might  be  well  to  describe  more  specifi- 
cally the  exact  relation  which  exists  between  religion 
and  rationality.  In  the  first  place,  the  life  of  reason 
is  the  seat  of  all  ultimate  values.  But  religion  also 
deals  with  the  ultimate,  and  when  the  loftiest  spirits 
have  seemied  to  attain  the  highest  joys,  it  has  usually 
been  through  religion.  Therefore,  Santayana  concludes, 

"religion  would seemi  to  be  a vehicle  or  a factor  in 

rational  life,  since  the  ends  of  rational  life  are  attaine 
by  it."^  But  this  is  not  the  only  relation.  The  two 
operate  sim.ilarly.  "The  Life  of  Reason,"  says  Santayana, 
"is  an  ideal  to  which  everything  in  the  world  should  be 

subordinated;  it  establishes  lines  of  moral  cleavage  every 

2 

where  and  miakes  right  eternally  different  from,  wrong." 

But  this  very  differentiation  between  right  and  wrong, 
this  absolute  moral  decision  is,  after  all,  a fundamental 
of  religion.*  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  religion 
is  act’ually  a f^oncticn  of  the  life  of  reason.  Indeed, 
Santayana  calls  religion  an  imaginative  symibol  for  the 


1 . Op  . cit . p . 6 . 
3 . Idem  . p . 7 . 


-17- 


life  of  reason.^ 

Religion  deals  with  much  the  same  subjects  as  the 

life  of  reason,  but  it  gives  them  a different  form;. 

Rational  religion  is  not  nov;  an  agent  of  revelation  of 

"divine  personalities,  future  awards,  and. tenderer 

3 

Elysian  consolations."  It  deals  with  an  experiential 
Vv'orld,  which  it  gives  an  ideal  status  . It  teaches  men 
to  accept  a natural  life,  although  on  supernatural 
grounds.  It  is  still  a poetic  expression  of  ignorance 
and  hope  and  dependence.  Rational  or  not,  religion  is 
built  on  fear  and  aspiration.  In  tim.e  of  need  everyone 
turns  to  the  gods  . Religion  consists  of  "conscious 
ideas,  hopes,  enthusiasms,  and  objects  of  v/orship;  it 

3 

operates  by  grace  and  flo"arishes  by  prayer."  Neverthe- 
less, even  rational  religion  remains  a merely  imaginative 
achievement,  a symbolic  representation  of  moral  reality. 
This  representation,  however,  ma^’’  play  an  important  part 
in  vitalising  the  mind  and  in  passing  on  the  lessons  taught 
by  experience.  For,  after  all,  "religion  is  a part  of 
experience  itself,  a mass  of  sentiments  and  ideas." 

1 . Op  . cit  . p . 178 . 

3 . Introduction  and  Reason  in  Common  Sense,  p . 13  . 

3.  Reason  in  Religion,  p.  8. 


Al  , 


-18- 


This  same  experiential  characteristic  of  religion 
Santayana  further  refers  to  in  another  passage.  ’’Even 
highly  imaginative  things,  like  poetry  and  religion," 

he  says,  "express  real  events,  if  not  in  the  outer  world, 
at  least  in  the  inner  growth  or  discipline  of  life.... 

It  is  nature,  or  some  movement  of  nature  occurring  within 
us  or  affecting  "us,  that  is  the  true  existent  objject  of 
religion."^  Thus,  religion  seems  to  he  in  many  cases 
merely  a poetic  nat-'oralism . 

But  although  it  symbolizes  nature,  religion  is  not 
literally  true.  "The  only  truth  of  religion  comes  from 
its  interpretation  of  life,  from  its  symbolic  rendering 
of  that  moral  experience  which  it  springs  out  of  and 

r*. 

<0 

which  it  seeks  to  elucidate."  As  a matter  of  fact, 
the  lack  of  literal  truth  is  not  an  affair  of  great  import . 
IThat  if  religion  does  deal  with  myths  or  "speculative 
fables"?  Even  where  it  deludes  into  a belief  in  its 
strict  accuracy,  it  is  not  essentially  an  imposture. 
"Religion,"  says  Santayana,  "is  an  interp'retat ion  of 
experience,  honestly  made,  and  made  in  view  of  man's 
happiness  and  its  empirical  conditions.  That  this  in- 
terpretation is  poetical  goes  without  saying,  since  natural 


1.  Santayana,  George,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  Vol . 18,  No. 
38,  Dec.  33,  1931,  p.  703. 

3.  Reason  in  Religion,  p . 11  . 


?s. 


-i'»; 


■;.• ::  M ' ^ ?>r*  i . 1.  i'  - 'f  ^v-f  j: ::i :;  n n ^ , . ■ _ ^ 


*•••  ' “•;^  VsV^f  '•. 

^ 1_  •-  ..  J ti  1 V --  1 ^ 'V  i‘  ^ A , ■' 


^ \T  C ;■  ; -•'  j . V < . i’  • i, 


:>■  i;.-: 

'■'  ' _ -T  '• 


njir^iXST-  ^&;oXT 


.-■»i 


■* . -ci  I ■ 


<f  %»  ■ , ^ ^ ^ ^ 


v^?  ■•*>••“  ■•■  • • ' ■*  -‘  ■'  ■*"  * -*'-  “ 

v-v- 


,.  J j;>  ' 

«.4v4  ' r^  :-  <a,  - 1 -'■  • 

. C'J-  -3,4  . f »»  ■■  ^ A •*  g 


•/«  /ut'i  :o 


■ i ivc*'  : X 9 -f' '? 


. r- J i: Oi<  .*•; . bJ-  * 


:..va  V/ 

'■-  -■  T^ 


-L  > Jit  A,  1? 


; ‘.'>  r:  ’ '■  L ■' * •’  • ■'*  -■  >■  1 o>  J i.  i ' ® £*'c4  0. 

....  ,,.  ivj  ^ v,v  X ;:;j-;.A. 

. • '*'  ■ 


■"•s 


■/•',  , ^ j..;. 


<3  A. 


T'’:ii;.Xujcl  , ^ ■ ' 


r .4 


.».  '-V,  > 


> ,-  t 


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j.  ; 


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P.^ 


and  moral  acience,  even  tc-day,  are  inadequate  for  the 
task.  But  the  mythical  form  into  which  men  cast  their 
wisdom  v;as  nor  chosen  by  them  because  they  preferred  to 

be  imaginative Mythical  forms  were  adopted  because 

none  other  were  available Whether  it  is  rhe  myth 

or  the  v;isdcm  it  expresses  that  we  call  religion  is  a 
matter  of  words. The  myth  is  merely  an  ideal  inter- 
pretation of  events  in  terms  relative  to  spirit;  it  digests 
phenomena  and  transmutes  them  into  imaginative  tissue. 

All  nature  is  at  first  conceived  mythically.  Later,  how- 
ever, myths  serve  "to  carry  religion  over  from  superstition 

into  wisdom,  from  an  excuse  and  apology  for  magic  into  an 

3 

ideal  representation  of  moral  goods.” 

Here,  then,  we  come  to  the  relation  of  religion  and 
ideals,  a relation  of  utmost  importance  to  the  forcier. 

For,  in  spite  of  the  "blind  side"  of  religion  expressed  in 
mythology  and  magic,  through  the  leaven  of  moral  idealism 
religion  inevitably  turns  toward  the  ultimate.  So  true 
is  this  that  although  religion  may  in  a primitive  state 
have  been  far  from  ideal,  now-a-days  men  are  "accustomed 
as  a matter  of  co^orse  to  associate  religion  with  ideal 
interests."  And  Santayana  thinks  that  to  be  successful 
and  permanent  a religion  must  pass  into  contemplation  and 


1 . Op  . cit  . _ p . 31 . 

2 . Op  . cit  . p . 66 . 

3 . Op  . cit  . p . 68 . 


SsK'*’®? 


: ■:  £tO  »jl ■:■»■«?■•  iiv  ..  ■'!  Jifil  : iv  ' » • 

■■  ' ’Cfwi-05;^'-  I'jZOjo'P^  •■•;f-"i.‘  i".  1 ..  Jy^i  .3v 

,:■  -j:  uJ  : ':■  t *i  *is  ■ - 


4.  .• 


Vi.  ,<.c: 

■.'.  . -•  .-.1 

3 TO 


:•  ■ 


. ■ ; "iii  '0:  " iiviJ.^r  -r 


rgi3Jb#OT!qt,;: 


. . .,  , .-  . 


■ .s 


f.v ; i'j'v,bf'=jwO*e 

-„  , ,•=;  0,3ui.^ 

sv 

- ■ > , - ^ ■ 
' ,,  ;.■:  T./  t 


.,.-.oia3  ..■•eiri^b*: ;•-•  -c-ii’i  *.7"  ■.  ’. . s-'jjj. i XI A 

. ■.-7:Kr  ,i  n'l iJ-o  4* 3ve.^:' . e'.tiv*). 

•.  >1  7..;-.-  e.ijVOXO-  i^U  .^''^1 


'..  I V.  % •'^••./ • A-.'-  i j 3 i^.7i  V 't  ' ^■ 

• » :‘  V ‘ r.  , 


^ ■•:;  -^3  q-3  -C-.-liJO.  ^ ' 

. v3™ 


.^•4.  i 

.L' 


. . ' ■ l3  V .',' *7  V K-v/iJ''*  u*  TO'  .i-'i  3 Jjf.iSTj  .■  *4^i 

t;  Jt  ^ 

,, , ^ A ^ 


ui 


•.'•*^:)  Iu.i'i  .'.4 


. 6'<-p>-V;f  V i-L 


•.  ' -i  .-■  ■•  (•  rt  f "1  ^ 

( -uX.  ^ V ^ V •,  V . .(» 


; i -73:..  4.,.:^ 


; 't  . . . 


ii.f  i :;3ir 

. ; j .- 0 c X X’  6t’ 

■3C>',i»:  ..y  i 3/5  r«.pUfT  w 


,■)  i *••••  i i 6 T c-  J i t ■-'  - V.  .3  C‘ 


''iV'9*  *«5 


■ ■ ‘ • t';  ^ ^ 


■ ' s;iii 

„ .-^int.:..  ■ ■: -.,;a4 

^ . .'■  *1 


.1  ."■  ^ 


<4  •:  n 


< jO  Tl  • : 


^ ^ r- 

W*  4k  ' 


-30- 


ideality  . 

Religion  is  a struggling  and  changing  force  which 
seems  to  direct  man  toward  the  eternal,  toward  the  ideal 
of  human  aspiration.  Usually  this  goal  takes  the  form 
of  a deity,  a perfect  being.  Regarding  this  embodiment 

Santayana  says,  "The  ideal  of  deity is  nothing  but  the 

ideal  of  man  freed  from  those  limitations  which  a humble 
and  wise  man  accepts  for  himself,  but  which  a spiritual 
man  never  ceases  to  feel  as  limitations."^  It  is  the 

2 

indwelling  ideal  which  lends  all  the  gods  their  divinity . 

The  gods  of  primitive  man  are  not  ideal,  because 
they  express  not  so  much  the  aspiration  of  man  as  his 
fear.  Usually  they  were  symbols  for  natural  forces, 
and  thus  their  ideality  was  prejudiced.  Later  the 
myths,  which  were  originally  merely  empirical  descrip- 
tions, became  either  idols  substituted  for  ideal  values, 
or  agents  to  morality  by  presenting  men  with  "an  ideal 
standard  for  action  and  a perfect  object  for  contempla- 
tion" 

Pantheism  fails  as  a religion  because  it  makes  a 
fetich  of  nature  and  thus  neglects  ideals.  "Nature," 
Santayana  declares,  "neither  is  nor  can  be  man's  ideal. 

The  substitution  of  nature  for  the  traditional  and  ideal 
object  of  religion  involves  giving  nature  moral  authority 


1 . Op  . cit . p . 45  . 

2 . Idem . p . 190 . 

3 . Idem . p . 66 . 


-21- 


over  man  . " 

The  gods  of  the  early  Greeks  were  frankly  natural, 
to  be  sure.  Yet  they  were  ideal  because  they  were  neither 
a direct  expression  of  fear  nor  the  imirediate  embodiment 
of  natural  forces.  True,  Apollo  was  the  driver  of  the 
sun,  and  the  other  gods  had  their  natural  functions. 

But  they  were  distinct  from  those  functions  and  had  a 
rational  as  well  as  a physical  part  to  play  . 

With  the  later  Greeks,  the  gods  lost  almost  complete- 
ly their  natural  character.  The  deity  of  Aristotle  is 
always  a moral  ideal,  while  to  Plato  the  deity  was  a 
universal  pattern  for  all  that  was  ideal  in  the  world  of 
experience.  In  this  conception  the  latter  philosopher 
showed  a keen  insight  into  the  psychology  which  lies 
behind  man's  tendency  to~;ard  deification. 

In  the  Hebrew  religion  God  was  the  supreme  ideal, 
nature  having  no  part  . But  this  ideal  was  unsatisfactory 
because  it  lacked  the  element  of  aspiration,  which  is 
so  decided  a characteristic  of  Christianity  . Further, 
such  ms  the  religion  of  the  Jews  that  no  liberal  inter- 
ests V7ere  afforded  for  the  ideal  to  express.  These 
interests  were  contributed  to  Christianity  in  its  transi- 
tion from  Hebrew  to  Gentile.  "Christianity,"  Santayana 
states,  "v/ould  have  remained  a Jewish,  sect  had  it  not  been 


1 . Op  . ci t . p . 137 . 


-I'-  . ■■■  --V^  -iV  - 

“ .-enlk  ...■•  .- 32  Xi3i<>‘*i*.A  Pit  T 

r..  •.  f ■•“  -*.  *■.'  , - ,.4i 

^ ’ i.  un£^  • , -V** 

^ •••'fe. ; IfiiTT;*  ':(  f- 1 ‘i-  r-r,  i;i^7p-r>  ‘;i'^ 


'X'.; 


‘ «e< 

. ■ ..:?t 


2Ti  -;  ie^asai^^:  -■.  - 

■^'4 


Vii 


.:-•'  . ) v-i 


V 


32- 


ir.ade  at  once  speculative,  universal,  and  ideal  by  the 

infusion  of  Greek  thought.” 

There  is  noticeable  in  the  development  of  deity 

from  the  first  primitive  conception  to  the  highest  plane 

of  rational  religion,  a decrease  in  the  element  of  fear 

and  an  increase  in  that  of  aspiration.  This  aspiring 

side  of  religion  Santayana  designates  as  spirituality, 

or  devotion  to  ideal  ends.  It  is  an  ideal  synthesis 

of  all  that  is  good.  Even  animal  feelings  may  be 

"spiritual  in  their  nature  and,  on  their  narrow  basis, 

perfectly  ideal  . The  most  ideal  human  passion  is  love, 

which  is  also  the  most  absolute  and  animal  and  one  of  the 

2 

most  ephemeral."  Indeed,  Santayana  considers  spirituality 
the  fundamental  and  native  type  of  all  life.^  "A  man," 
he  says,  "is  spiritual  vvhen  he  lives  in  the  presence  of 
the  ideal,  and  whether  he  eat  or  drink  does  so  for  the 

4 

sake  oi  a true  and  ultimate  good."  And  by  its  varia- 
tions and  greater  or  less  transparency  and  ideality  he 

believes  the  degree  of  spiritual  insight  which  has  been 

5 

reached  may  be  measured. 


1 . 

Op  . cit  . 

p . 84  . 

2 . 

Idem . p . 

196  . 

3 . 

Idem . p . 

195  . 

4 . 

Idem . p . 

193  . 

5 . 

Idem . p . 

228  . 

.-j-  ■ i 

- T-J':"'  ■■■  '-  r - 'V  . ;^in.4!l'-^”  -.  ' ■.'■-'•■ 

; - ■ ’ ■ ■'  Tr'  , 


K ^ jc;IB '-'iwi  ' •*.  ‘ ■ 


*™‘;.  V-*  i*>* 

jjj:  i:s •; #»,i& '♦* X ■ 'te  ^ * t ,^tt ^'. 

.->-*'  r-  - •'*-  -^  *'<■  a *•  r - r • 1»V!5?1  «. 


'■ 


^ -?■’ 

.^J 


Li. 


■* 

.. 


♦ •I-  • » / ^ 


‘ r.  . 


*7*y^  fM 

irJ(3WiB.  . 

*•  * * ■ • *'  • (.^ 

>.'• 


* - T 

•i  ^<j£u  '»  *P^ 

.•“5,T  1 

■' » 

i’l'i- 

• , . "t  ’ ^ 

i 

1 

2iJf’ 

• i 

T **« 

• '■  i r'^ 

This  intimate  connection  with  the  ideal  is  not  ori- 
ginal in  most  religions  . It  is  only  slowly  and  reluct- 
antly  that  religion  has  suffered  spiritualization.-^  Once, 
however,  this  life  in  the  ideal  has  been  attained,  spirit- 
uality uses  the  strength  of  its  position  to  remodel  all 
it  receives  and  to  look  to  the  future. 

The  first  concern  of  spir it’cality  is  morality.  There 
is  another  phase  to  rational  religion — that  of  piety,  or 
loyalty  to  necessary  conditions.  But  this  phase  of  de- 
votion to  the  gods  is  never  the  so-orce  of  morality;  it  is 
rather,  Santayana  states,  an  incidental  expression  of 
morality 

Although  morality  is  now  closely  associated  with  re- 
ligion, yet  morals  have  always  flourished  independent  of 
theology.  And  only  through  spiritualization  does  religion 
acq'uire  a coloring  of  morality  . The  Jews  were  among  the 
first  to  link  the  two.  Their  prophets  preached  virtuous 
living  as  a means  of  salvation  for  their  race  from  the 
wrath  of  Jehovah.  ''By  assigning  a magic  value  to  morality, 
says  Santayana,  "they  gave  a moral  value  to  religion.'"^ 

For  even  superstitions  may  have  a moral  tinge  in  a moral 
mind.  And  what  makes  piety  an  integral  part  of  traditional 


1 . 

Op  . c i t . 

p . 68 

2 . 

Idem  . p . 

18?  . 

3 . 

Idem  . p . 

74  . 

-34- 


religions  is  the  fact  that  moral  realities  are  repre- 
sented in  the  popular  mind  by  poetic  symbols.^ 

It  has  been  stated  previously  that  religion  is  con- 
cerned essentially  with  experience.  If  this  be  true, 
the  ideal  is  fundamentally  a part  of  rational  religion, 
since  it  is  a term  of  moral  experience.  Indeed,  Santa- 
yana asserts  that  there  can  be  no  moral  allegiance  except 
to  the  ideal  Further,  rational  religion  should  be  an 
index  to  virtue,  which  Santayana  calls  "a  natural  excel- 
lence,  the  ideal  expression  of  human  life".  insofar, 
then,  as  religion  associates  itself  with  virtue,  or 
morality,  it  is  truly  an  embodiment  of  the  ideal. 

One  phase  of  religion  which  is  often  closely  related 
to  virtue  and  the  ideal  is  immortality  . It  is  a question 
which  has  interested  all  philosophers  . "Enthusiasm  for 

the  ideal  led  Plaio  to  treat  all  beauties  as  stepping- 

stones  toward  a perfect  beauty  in  which  all  their  charms 
might  be  present  together,  eternally  and  without  alloy . 

Enthusiasm  for  the  ideal pers'-aaded  him  that  mortal 

life  was  only  an  impeded  effort  to  fall  back  into  eter- 
nity.""^ Aristotle  found  no  grounds  for  a belief  in 


1 . Op  . cit  . p . 180  . 
3 . Idem  . p . 98  . 

3 . Idem  . p . 73 . 


4 . Idem  . p . 133 . 


-35- 


immortality  of  the  soul,  neither  did  the  Hebrews  believe 
in  a Heaven  which  should  reward  righteous  living  by  pro- 
longed existence.  The  early  Christians,  however,  martyrs 
that  the^'’  were  to  pagan  torture,  found  the  plan  of  salva- 
tion an  ideal  necessity  . 

Wnether  or  not  there  be  immortality  of  the  soifL, 
there  does  exist  another  sort  of  imruortality , an  ideal 

principle  revealed  to  insight  . Memory  provides  such 
a form,  since  it  retains  in  the  present  what  is  long 
past.  . Further,  even  after  a man's  death,  his  works 
live  on  after  him.  And  it  is  this  continued  existence 

which  is  the  finest.  For,  "since  the  ideal  has 

perpetual  pertinence  to  mortal  struggles,"  Santayana 
declares,  "he  who  lives  in  the  ideal  and  leaves  it  ex- 
pressed  in  society  or  in  art  sn;joys  a double  immortality.""^ 

Perhaps  the  most  common  error  in  regard  to  religion, 
and  illustrated  by  this  very  doctrine  of  immortality  of 
the  soul,  is  a belief  that  aims,  because  they  are  religious, 
must  necessarily  be  attainable.  Yet  the  ideals  of  religion 
may  never  be  realized  and  the  possibility  of  defeat  is  one 
of  the  circumstances  with  which  meditation  must  sqijare  the 
ideal.  But  the  trouble  is  not  so  much  v/irh  religion  it- 


1 . Op  . cit  . p . 373  . 


-ijD  — 


self,  but  with  that  which  it  sets  up  as  its  ideal. 
"Ideals,"  says  Santayana,  "must  not  transgress  certain 
bounds.  The  practical  ideal,  that  which  under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  is  best  to  aim  at  and  pray  for,  will  not 
rebel  against  destiny."^  Hat urally,  even  religious 

ideals  are  not  realizable  together,  or  even  singly  when 

3 

they  have  no  deep  roots  in  the  world. 

The  absence  of  this  worldly  quality  is  the  reason 
why  religion,  which  is  so  profoundly  moving  and  so  pro- 
foundly just,  which  is  the  source,  perhaps,  of  the  best 
human  happiness,  may  still  fail  to  function  rationally. 
Santayana  states  the  case  in  the  following  words;  "Reli- 
gion pursues  rationality  through  the  imagination 

\Tnen  it  gives  precepts,  insinuates  ideals,  or  remoulds 
aspiration,  it  is  an  imaginative  substitute  for  wisdom — 

I mean  for  the  deliberate  and  impartial  pursuit  of  all 
good.  The  conditions  and  the  aims  of  life  are  both 
represented  in  religion  poetically,  but  this  poetry  tends 
to  arrogate  to  itself  literal  truth  and  moral  authority, 
neither  of  which  it  possesses." 

If  religion  were  content  to  imagine  improvements  all 
might  be  well  and  good.  But  when  it  takes  the  stand 

1 . Op  . cit  . p . 4r4  . 

3.  Introduction  and  Reason  in  Common  Sense,  p.  8. 

3.  Reason  in  Religion,  p . 13  . 


'3f^.  - 


^ “.  '■"’  S?‘  V 


w-'  • •■  '■'-'»'■■■  ,:-^:..w'-J™  V'4;  %>^>'  M ' -'^’---- 

.'v  ' ■ ' ..;^;--i.  ■^'‘  *■ 


C-'  T '■'  % * 

',v'  . ' ■ 


'■  ,c4^ot:c^.  e^f?  . 

?ri^'  u‘  ; ., , ,-jQi>  ^4?  t X ^"5.  Ml? 


• * V 0'»i .,  r ■?£*  i -Kfiv  ^ ^ 

•'•'  ♦ ''  •"  ’-'-litf*  .5B^  €P  .:»W(M.  *-  V- 


1^.  7 


•t_i»  "f'.'  jT  'll«*s' 


■ ■ ' i '■'^-iJ  , i 'J  4 ' 5'"^  ^ ' ^ 


B ■'  '»)^j£  .niii  0-5-(589‘^^-)  •> 

r^'."  ■ :uy 


' -*  ’ •.‘X.W’'  ^ 4 


' 


V4.;r§;tsn^‘4X  .'5: 

mSkTwTSBu^^^I 


-3?- 


that  the  world  Is  really  such  as  its  imaginings,  it  fails 

signally  as  an  exponent  of  the  life  of  reason.  Ideals, 

to  be  efficient,  must  have  a natural  basis,  and  the  value 

of  existences — religion  among  them — is  wholly  borrowed 

from  their  ideality.^  It  is  the  submerged  idealism, 

Santayana  declares,  which  alone  should  win  for  religion 

3 

a philosopher's  attention. 


1 . Op  . cit  . p . 349  . 
3 . Idem  . p . 68  . 


•"  >■  ■ ■ ^ 

'.n.  ■ ■ ;x.  ;« 

.;•  ,.A.  4^^'-  • W t'-..  ;■  ' .. ' *!T  ac  » 


SS??:; 


f.  m'  V’ 


- V 


-28- 


CHAPTER  IV. 

A CRITICAL  SUMI^RY. 

In  the  life  of  reason  the  ideal  plays  a dual  role. 

It  is  at  once  created  and  creator.  A goal  erected  by 
awakening  intelligence,  it  serves  also  as  an  urgent 
stimulus  to  the  development  of  rationality.  Granted 
entrance  in  the  race  with  reason,  it  swiftly  outstrips 
its  slower  fellow. 

Such,  at  least,  is  the  part  which  Santayana  accredits 
to  the  ideal  in  The  Life  of  Reason.  And  in  his  assump- 
tion he  seems  abundantly  justified.  The  age  of  belief 

in  a divine  origin  for  man's  higher  aims  has  largely 
passed  away,  speeded  by  an  amused  and  somewhat  rueful 
recognition  of  the  extreme  diversity  and  the  general 
inconsistency  of  human  ideals.  Santayana  is  right. 

Men  do  create  their  ideals.  And  further,  they  use 
their  creations  as  levers  by  which  to  raise  themselves. 

In  stressing  the  importance  of  the  elevating  function 
of  ideals  Santayana  has  made  a distinct  contribution  to 
social  philosophy.  Plato,  before  him,  had  emphasized 
the  existence  and  the  permanence  of  the  ideal,  but  to 
the  modern  philosopher  belongs  the  credit  of  giving 
life  to  this  erstwhile  inanimate  realm. 


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-39- 


There  is  at  least  an  apparent  inconsistency,  however, 
between  Santayana's  conception  of  the  ideal  as  an  active 
guide  in  conduct,  and  his  belief  in  the  actual  futility 
of  thought  as  an  agent  in  physical  action.  Santayana 
resembles  Huxley  in  the  theory  that  consciousness  is 
merely  the  bell  which  tinkles  an  acknowledgment  of  physical 
events  but  which,  in  itself,  is  powerless  to  cause  such 
events  to  occur.  This  negation  of  the  motivating  capacity 
of  thought  appears  in  Chapter  IX.  of  the  first  volume 
of*  The  Life  of  Reason.  ”How  Thought  Is  Practical”.  Here 
Santayana  outlines  the  sole  practical  value  of  thoiaght 
as  ideal.  ”Now  the  body  is  an  instrument,  the  mind  its 
function,  the  witness  and  reward  of  its  operation,”  he 
states.  The  internal  relation  of  ideas  is  purely 
dialectical.  "Their  realm  is  eternal  and  absolutely 
irrelevant  to  the  march  of  events."  Yet  thought,  accord- 
ing to  Santayana,  may  still  be  instrumental  in  promoting 
morality,  although  morality  is  ordinarily  considered 
inseparably  wedded  to  conduct . 

What,  then,  does  Santayana  mean?  Is  the  ideal 
a beautiful  fairy-tale,  permanently  delightful  and 
aesthetically  valuable,  but  still  eternally  a fairy-tale, — 
or  do  the  creations  of  reason  have  some  direct  influence? 


-30- 


Thought,  while  essentially  ideal,  is  yet  natural.  Nature 
is  made  up,  not  of  actions,  but  of  interactions.  The 
stream  may  erode  the  rocks  in  its  bed,  but  those  rocks 
meantime  retard  its  current.  So  thought,  affected  by 
conduct,  ought  in  turn  to  influence  physical  activity. 

And  indeed,  in  this  inconsistency  of  views,  one 
suspects  that  Santayana  actually  finds  more  leeway  for 
ideal  action  than  the  chapter  recently  cited  might  lead 
one  to  suppose.  It  is  a pity,  however,  that  Santayana 
should  get  himself  into  such  a blind  alley  of  logic . 

If  one  admits  that  reason  has  no  power  as  a physical 
agent,  then  the  value  of  the  discussion  of  ideals  is 
seriously  impaired.  “What  folly  it  would  be  to  talk 
about  ideals  as  guides  in  conduct,  as  aids  in  aspiration 
toward  morality,  and  so  on,  when  they  can  be,  in  reality, 
no  such  things'.  Either  they,  and  thought  with  them, 
must  be  given  some  real  inspirational  function,  or  they 
are  useless  appendages  not  worthy  of  discussion. 

The  trouble  is  that  Santayana  gets  into  this  impasse 
through  the  very  method  by  which  he  first  evolves  his 
life  of  reason.  Once  a philosopher  assumes  the  sub- 
jective point  of  view,  he  is  doomed  forever  to  certain 
difficulties  which  so  far  have  proved  insoluble.  It 
is  regretable  that  Santayana  could  not  have  adopted  the 


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iv.  ..  . a.ft-0 Jt 'io'.’  ^‘s4  i 'W-^oa ■ >y.^^.^^;. 

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*■  • vilt  «fc...  ' . 


-31- 


objectivity  of  the  early  Greeks,  rather  than  the  sub- 
jectivity of  the  later  schools  . 

It  is  this  point  of  view  which  forces  him  to  the 
belief  that  knowledge  is  ideal — merely  a matter  of 
representation  and  never  of  actual  contact.  Whether 
or  not  this  theory  be  true,  it  is  seriously  challenged 
by  many  of  the  modern  philosophers,  who  believe  the 
eternal  barrier  siJperable  from  another  approach. 

Another  point  open  to  question  in  Santayana’s  dis- 
cussion of  the  ideal  lies  in  the  relation  of  value  to 
origin.  In  that  chapter  devoted  to  a caustic  summary 
of  his  critics,  he  laughs  at  them  for  believing  ’’that 
ideas  whose  materials  could  all  be  accounted  for  in 
consciousness  and  referred  to  sense  or  to  the  operations 
of  mind  were  thereby  exhausted  and  deprived  of  further 
validity.”^  Their  value  is  ideal — far  from  the  plane 
of  their  origin.  But  no  plant  can  long  exist  independent 
of  the  elements  from  which  it  springs  . Insofar,  there- 
fore, as  he  estimates  the  value  of  ideals  without  reference 
to  their  originating  conditions,  Santayana  is  treading  on 
dangerous  gro’jnd . Wisely,  however,  he  does  not  fail 
entirely  to  consider  in  his  evalijation  the  source  from 
which  ideals  have  sprung.  Indeed,  in  his  discussion  of 


1.  The  Life  of  Reason,  vol . I.,  p.  84. 


i' . 


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— -.c:r  '<..:  o^  1C  oc' -c-ls. j?5'ayOioe|o</'^ 

.v'  feevi'ivr^b-.^ni:  fce v':rvf>'^;t  cie-ir  •-  to  ■•• 

—■  'k5-  - . ' ..'v- 

r . ' . r ' f i 0 .a  T - ’ '^  • ; j i i i 4 ^^'  ■ - 

■ f-r;-8-L/n'i  ;^;:s  v^:'>X  n^-'. 


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(■Ji 


* . t 


-33- 


religious  ideals  he  classifies  as  the  least  desirable  those 
which  arise  from  fear. 

And  here,  again,  a minor  occasion  for  questioning 
occurs.  In  the  early  discussion  of  the  life  of  reason 
Santayana  warns  away  all  critics.  The  philosopher  who 
approaches  the  problem  must  neither  create  nor  judge;  he 
may  only  expound.  The  critical  faculty,  however,  is  not 
to  be  so  easily  subdued.  Even  Santayana  cannot-  refrain 
from  an  occasional  plunge  into  criticism  and  appraisal. 

But,  after  all,  these  are  minor  points,  imimportant 
perhaps  beside  many  other  exceptions  which  might  be  taken 
to  Santayana's  position.  No  philosophic  system,  however, 
has  been  fo\ind  closed  to  question.  And  for  the  most  part, 
the  treatment  of  ideals  in  The  Life  of  Reason  is  not  only 
interesting  but  is  highly  instructive,  a distinct  addition 
to  philosophic  thought  . 

We  are  indebted  to  Santayana,  in  the  first  place,  for 
bringing  back  to  modernity  the  Greeks  whom  he  so  admires  . 

His  complication  of  their  divergent  interests  is  masterly. 
Plato  plus  Aristotle  proves  both  a nourishing  and  a spicy 
dish,  especially  when  sauced  with  Heraclitus  and  Parmenides. 
In  this  comprehensive  summary  and  reinterpretation  of  their 
philosophies,  therefore,  Santayana  has  made  the  Greeks 
more  readily  available. 


'■C-.r- T2;  T'*'  .ifi,  -s^-'  : “’ ‘1-.  . 5fl  iP-  - e^-Sr»»  . 


aoiUiji>^  ^&^sl^ei^  js  ei,  fucf 

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;.  *xl6if^ , lowii: : ^ rsx 

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'-'  / 


-33- 


A further  contribution  lies  in  the  lucidity  with 
which  Santayana  endows  the  problem  of  the  ideal.  Whereas 
the  Platonic  ideal  was  left  eternally  up  in  the  air,  Santa- 
yana has  brought  his  down  to  earth  and  has  put  it  through 
its  paces.  No  longer  is  it  to  be  merely  an  idle  figment 
of  the  imagination.  He  has  endowed  it  with  aesthetic 
and  practical  value  and  has  made  it  a distinct  factor  in 
rational  existence. 

And  this,  probably,  constitutes  the  greatest  service 
originating  from  his  discussion  of  the  ideal.  When 
Santayana  first  pointed  out  that  ideals  are  pertinent 
because  they  arise  in  direct  response  to  human  demands, 
that  they  have  a fundamentally  natural  basis,  and  that 
they  are  spiritual  realities,  he  forged  a weapon  which 
should  be  efficacious  in  defeating  the  purely  mechanistic 
course  toward  which  modern  thought  appears  to  be  turning. 


